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RECENT DECISIONS
practical matter, the effects of this decision will be limited to areas with a small
population. The Court of Appeals readily accepted this proposition, but has left
the result in doubt if a committee, appointed after the presumption became
conclusive, attempted to bring an action to set aside the deed.
Robert J. Lane
Right of Licensed Practitioner to Enjoin Unlicensed
Practice in His Profession
In an action by licensed chiropractors to enjoin the defendants from prac-
ticing chiropractic without a license, held (5-2): the right to practice a profession
is a "valuable interest" and, since unlicensed practice infringes upon this interest,
equity may enjoin such practice despite the fact that it also constitutes a breach
of the criminal law. Burden v. Hoover, 9 II. 2d 114, 137 N. E. 2d 59 (1956).
It is well settled that equity has no jurisdiction where an adequate remedy
at law exists. Lewis v. City of Lockport, 276 N. Y. 336, 12 N. E. 431 (1938);
County of Cook v. Davis, 143 Ill. 151, 32 N. E. 176 (1892). However, the fact
that the acts of a defendant subject him to prosecution under the criminal law
does not of itself deny equitable jurisdiction. If there is an independent ground
for equitable relief, the criminality of the act is only a factor to be considered by
the courts in determining whether equitable intervention is necessary. People ex
rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 14 N. E. 2d 439 (1938); 4 POMEROY'S
EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE §1347 (5th ed. 1941).
Also, it is generally accepted that a license to practice a profession is a
property right in the sense that state actions which affect it must satisfy due
process of law. People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809 (1921); Bender v.
Board of Regents of State of New York, 262 App. Div. 627, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 779
(3d Dep't 1941). However, whether this property interest is sufficient to enable
a licensed practitioner to enjoin an unlicensed individual from practice is a
question which finds the courts in conflict. Those which answer in the affirmative
point to the extensive training which is a prerequisite to obtaining a professional
license (as the court did in the instant case), Doworken v. Apartment House
Owners' Ass'n of Cleveland, 380 Ohio App. 265, 175 N. E. 577, (1931), or take
as granted that a sufficient property right exists. Ezell V. Ritholz, 188 S. C. 39,
198 S. E. 19 (1938); Siefert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N. W. 784
(1936). Where relief has been denied, the courts have generally based their
decisions either on the theory that the licensing statutes were enacted for the public
benefit and do not operate to give individual licensees any rights which equity will
protect, New Hampshire Board of Registration in Optometry v. Scott Jewelry Co.,
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90 N. H. 368, 9 A. 2d 513 (1939), Delaware Optometric Ass'n v. Sherwood,-
Del. Ch.-, 122 A. 2d 424 (1956), or on the grounds that no substantial injury
has been shown. Wollitzer v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 148 Misc. 529, 266
N. Y. Supp. 184 (1933); afld without opinion 241 App. Div. 757, 270 N. Y.
Supp. 968 (2d Dep't 1934).
New York follows a substantial majority of states in permitting the Attorney
General to enjoin the unlicensed practice of a profession if a public nuisance can
be shown. People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, supra. However, as to the right of the
individual practitioner to such an injunction, the lower courts have consistently
refused to recognize a sufficient property interest in the licensees upon which to
base such relief, Wollitzer v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., supra (attorney),
Goldsmith v. Jewish Press Pub. Co., 118 Misc. 789, 195 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1922)
(Certified Public Accountant); and the Court of Appeals apparently has not yet
been faced with the precise issue. But cf. Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209 (1852).
A strictly logical approach to this problem would require a refusal to
recognize a substantial property interest in a professional license. There was no
right at common law to be free from competition and it is extremely doubtful
that the legislature intended to create such a right by the enactment of the
licensing statutes. New Hampshire Board of Registration in Optometry v. Scott
Jewelry Co., supra at 518; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §710, comment d (1938).
However, there are certain policy considerations which seem to justify a contrary
result. Regardless of who was intended to benefit from the licensing statute, it is
clear that the licensed practitioner has paid a high price, in both time and money,
in return for his right to practice. Justice would seem to dictate that he be
entitled to protect himself from unauthorized interference with the exercise of this
right. Also, preservation of a profession's reputation and protection of the public
welfare require that the profession be policed, and unlicensed practice eliminated;
the individual practitioners are probably equipped to handle such a task, along
with the Attorney General.
Edwin P. Yaeger
Criminal Law: Entrapment
Defendant, who had no previous record for dealing in narcotics, was suc-
cessfully induced by a government agent to produce a seller and to facilitate a
sale of heroin. Defendant put forth the defense of entrapment. Conceding that
the defendant had been induced to commit the offense, the issue evolved around
whether the prosecution had made a valid reply to the defense. Held (2-1):
defendant's ready complaisance to the agent's request was sufficient to indicate
